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ATHANASIUS KIRCHER’S MAGICAL INSTRUMENTS  
An Essay on ‘Science’, ‘Religion’ and Applied Metaphysics 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper I endeavour to bridge the gap between the history of material culture and the 
history of ideas. I do this by focussing on the intersection between metaphysics and 
technology - what I call ‘applied metaphysics’ - in the oeuvre of the Jesuit scholar Athanasius 
Kircher. By scrutinising the interplay between texts, objects and images in Kircher’s work, it 
becomes possible to describe the multiplicity of meanings related to his artefacts. I unearth as 
yet overlooked metaphysical and religious meanings of the camera obscura, for instance, as 
well as of various other optical and magnetic devices. Today, instruments and artefacts are 
almost exclusively seen in the light of a narrow economic and technical concept. Historically, 
the ‘use’ of artefacts is much more diverse, however, and I argue that it is time to historicize 
the concept of ‘utility’.   
 
Keywords 
Jesuit science, utility, material culture, history of ideas, magnetic theology, light metaphysics, 
camera obscura, technological expressionism, philosophy of artefacts. 
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‘via the Jesuit Telegraph, they enjoy their d’d Marvel of instant 
Communication,’ far-reaching and free of error, thanks to giant 
balloons sent to great Altitudes, Mirrors of para- (not to mention dia-) 
bolickal perfection, beams of light focused to hitherto unimagined 
intensities, so, at any rate, say the encrypted reports that find their 
ways to the desks of highly-plac’d men whose daily task it is, to make 
sure they know every-thing, appropriate to their places, that must 
be known.  
- Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon (1997) - 
 
Introduction 
 
If one were transposed to the seventeenth-century museum of the Collegio Romano, the Jesuit 
college in Rome, one would encounter a totally different world: a world stuffed with 
prodigies, exotic animals, relics, obelisks and bizarre machines. One would enter the fantastic 
universe of Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680), who was the head of the museum, professor at 
the college and a famous intellectual and ‘experimentalist’. Some of Kircher’s instruments 
have already been subject to elaborate scholarly interpretative efforts, but even these, such as 
the sunflower clock, the magnetic Jesus rescuing Peter in the midst of the waters, and the cats 
locked into a catoptric chest, still turn our categories upside down and keep defying our 
understanding. Their utility and the ways to use them are not self-evident; their purposes, their 
meanings, the ‘language they speak’, are alien to us. Kircher’s artefacts have become ‘unreal’ 
for us, and in order to understand them, it is necessary to draw on all resources possible. In 
particular, as I will show, it is crucial to pay attention to the interplay between his texts, 
objects and images as well as their diverse contexts and uses.1 
                                                 
1 For background on Kircher, see especially the new and excellent introduction by Paula Findlen (Findlen, 
2004b), which gives an overview of Kircher’s life and work, and relates the ambiguous attitude of many 
contemporaries towards him. Luminaries like Peirsec, Mersenne, Leibniz and many other were lured into 
Kircher’s world and at certain times supported, appreciated or drew upon his work. The literature on Kircher is 
expanding rapidly. See especially Findlen (2004a), Beinlich (2002), Rowland (2001a), Sardo (2001) and 
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In this paper, I try to uncover the meanings of Kircher’s artefacts by confronting them with 
hitherto neglected parts of his texts. I focus on the metaphysical epilogues in two of Kircher’s 
books, the Magnes sive de arte magnetica opus tripartitum (1641, third edition 1654) and the 
Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae (1646, second edition 1671), and I establish their relation with 
the body of the text, with his artefacts and with the practices in which both texts and artefacts 
were used. Until now, there has been little real interest in this aspect of Kircher’s thought, and 
these abstract metaphysical texts have seemed rather awkward appendices to treatises centred 
on instruments. Recent developments in the historiography of material culture have yielded 
important new insights in Kircher’s artefacts, natural philosophy and experimental pursuits, 
but lofty metaphysics seems to be a blind spot for such a perspective. I hope that a slight shift 
in focus will be able to shed new light on the current Kircher-debate. In particular, I will argue 
that the meaning of his metaphysical chapters is central to the meaning of his artefacts, and 
vice versa.  
In this paper, I aim at blending the history of material culture with the history of ideas, and I 
hope to show the fruitfulness of such an approach. This text is thus an essay in ‘applied 
metaphysics’ in the simple sense that it relates Kircher’s abstract metaphysical considerations 
to its applications in ‘science and technology’.2 It is also an essay in applied metaphysics as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Stolzenberg (2001a) for recent scholarly works, often the reflection of a conference or exhibition. See Bartola 
(2004) and Jäger (2003) for the most recent overviews of the literature. Brauen (1982) gives an outline of the 
literature till 1980, and gives some idea of the changing appreciation of Kircher through the centuries (Fletcher 
1981 and 1988 are also still useful in that respect). See Haakman’s (1991) documentary novel on the resurgent 
interests in Kircher in the 1980s, and especially on the spurious Internationalen Athanasius Kircher 
Forschungsgesellschaft, before the revival of Kircher in genuine international scholarship. 
2 Just like the concept ‘science’ has been challenged for early modern history (Cunningham, 1988; Cunningham 
and Williams, 1993), the notion of ‘technology’ can be questioned as well. Kircher studied many subjects, such 
as mixed mathematics, astronomy, cosmogony, natural history, natural philosophy, natural magic and artificial 
magic (see also note 27). Similarly, some of Kircher’s ‘technologies’ were in fact mathematical and natural 
philosophical instruments; others were part of artificial or mathematical magic. Kircher himself invented many 
terms to categorise his instruments in more detail. Using the modern concept ‘science’ would obscure the 
particular differentiations between these seventeenth-century categories. Furthermore, it might confound our 
understanding of the distinctive nature of these practices as opposed to modern science (such as the often crucial 
role of God in early modern natural philosophical thought as opposed to secularised modern science). This paper 
can be read as providing a similar argument for the concept ‘technology’. Where appropriate, however, (to 
indicate broader historiographical issues, for instance) terms like ‘science’ and ‘technology’ can still be used 
(Jardine, 2000b). ‘Religion’ too is not an unproblematic historical category and in the course of this paper, the 
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Daston (2000, p. 1) defines it: ‘Applied metaphysics assumes that reality is a matter of degree, 
and that phenomena that are indisputably real in the colloquial sense that they exist may 
become more or less intensely real, depending on how densely they are woven into scientific 
thought and practice.’  
 
‘Inter-medial’ approaches 
 
The Jesuits have always been fond of mixed media spectacles, from the markedly sensual and 
visual Spiritual Exercises of their founding father Ignatius of Loyola, to the elaborate stage 
plays they performed in order to retrieve lost souls.3 The visual culture of the Jesuits and their 
taste for spectacle is well illustrated by the academic defences at the Collegio Romano as 
described by Louise Rice (1999). The academic defence of a young man was his first public 
‘performance’, which could be crucial in shaping his later career. It was thus important to 
attract and impress a large and aristocratic audience, which was why these defences evolved 
into a ‘lavish spectacle, theatrical in every sense’ (Rice, 1999, p. 158). A multi-media 
performance, of decorations, allusive music, poetry, and a broadsheet with an elaborate 
allegorical drawing and written elucidations, accompanied the words spoken by the student. 
The broadsheet, often designed by the student’s professors and executed by skilled craftsmen, 
was infused with an elaborate play of heraldry and Jesuit symbolism, making cross-references 
to the accompanying poems and songs. Around 1640, at the height of the broadsheet’s 
popularity, it became more than a metre in size and often took more than a year to produce.  
At the defence, when the patron of the student was first presented with the broadsheet, ‘he had 
just heard a panegyric in his honour in which the subject and significance of the invention 
                                                                                                                                                        
multiplicity and heterogeneous nature of practices related to (Christian and Catholic) ‘religion’ will also be 
underscored.  
3 For the Spiritual Exercises, see esp. Ignatius (1991), de Guibert (1964, pp. 109-139, pp. 527-565) and 
O’Malley (1993, pp. 37-50). For Jesuit theatricality, see Valentin (1978), McCabe (1983), Norman (2001), 
Gorman (1998, ch. 7), Vermeir (2005). 
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were already spelled out, and even as he studied the image he was listening to a motet, the 
verses of which provided an ampler explication of what he saw’ (ibid., p. 163).4 The student’s 
philosophical conclusions, in most cases prepared and written down by his professor, seemed 
to be of secondary importance compared with the elaborate exercise in the rhetoric of praise 
(which may have been considered to be more useful than the philosophical theses anyway, 
given the courtly context). As can be seen in Fig. 1, the emblematic image usurped almost the 
whole space on the broadsheet, leaving not much for the words, which had to be crammed at 
the bottom of the page. What we would today call ‘scientific themes’ were especially popular 
in the broadsheets of the Collegio Romano, ‘geography, cartography, chronometry, optics, 
magnetism, distillation, horticulture, astrology, and, above all, astronomy receive fanciful 
treatment in scores of theses,’5 but these ‘scientific elements’ were often more connected with 
symbolism and heraldry than with the contents of the defence. This already shows that 
something else than modern science was involved. The sun, for instance, could stand for 
Apollo, the Seminario Romano, the glory of a Cardinal, and Divine Wisdom. ‘It is all these 
things, nor are its different meanings in any sense contradictory’ (Rice, 1999, p. 163). 
This Jesuit academic defence – an ensemble of words, images, music and things, conjoined in 
a symbolic play – is an interesting instance of word-image-artefact interactions in the Baroque 
sciences. It is clear that meaning in such a multimedia spectacle does not reside in the text 
alone, nor in the image, but in the interplay of the different media, when the beholder directs 
his gaze from text to image and back, while listening to the disputation or the accompanying 
music.6 It is in this Baroque Jesuit context that what I would call an ‘inter-medial’ approach 
                                                 
4 See also Kircher’s musical ‘play’ in honor of the archduke before the preface of his Musurgia (Kircher, 1650) 
5 Rice (1999, p. 151). Some might have been inspired by Kircher’s fame, but regrettably, the study of the 
connection of these broadsheets with their broader mathematical and philosophical context is still 
underdeveloped.  
6 I am using a theory of meaning (based on Wittgenstein’s ideas) in which meaning is generated in specific local 
practices. In this paper, I show that Baroque Jesuit culture is a fitting starting point and an apt ‘local context’ for 
discovering the diverse meanings of Kircher’s instruments. I do not assume, however, that Baroque Jesuit culture 
is a homogeneous unity and I make clear in the course of this paper that it combines a multiplicity of different 
practices. 
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(which should be common historiographical practice) takes on a special import, because this 
context was characterised by a particular rhetoric and epistemology which drew heavily on 
analogical techniques. The meaning of a text fragment, an image or an artefact is always 
determined by its broader context, but this insight is much more important if a text, image or 
artefact is part of a complicated web of analogies and hidden references. As I will indicate 
below, these analogical techniques reached an apex in Kircher’s work.7  
The appearances of Kircher’s Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae and Magnes sive de arte 
magnetica opus tripartitum are not unrelated to those of the examined broadsheets (although 
the words still have the upper hand in Kircher’s books), and both show in an exemplary way 
how the Jesuits were skilled in interweaving meanings through different media. The merging 
of ‘scientific’ and symbolic elements, the importance of the elaborate and expensive 
illustrations, the profuse presence of heraldry and courtly politics, the theological and 
metaphysical aspects, the use of allegory and emblems, as well as the interplay between visual 
and textual languages are particularly striking. The respective frontispieces (figs. 5 and 6) 
already suggest these complex relations. In order to show how these frontispieces are related 
to the body of the work, I will give a brief overview of both the Magnes and the Ars Magna.8 
 
                                                 
7 Kircher often uses analogy, combinatorics, metaphor and ideas of harmony to connect a very diverse set of 
ideas and objects. See e.g. Leinkauf (1993, pp. 161-190) for Kircher’s analogical and combinatorial method. 
Bach (1985, pp. 131-194) and Leinkauf (1988) discuss Kircher’s method in general. See also Schmidt-Biggeman 
(1983) for the general context of the methods used to build universal sciences. Lacking from these discussions, 
however, is the religious tradition of the uses of analogy. The Bible itself is full of metaphors and parables. See 
de Lubac’s (1959-1966) and especially Brinkmann’s (1980) standard works on modes of scriptural 
interpretation. See also Brisson (2004) for neo-Platonic symbolism and myth interpretation in relation to 
scriptural interpretation. Of course, there existed other (albeit sometimes related) kinds of symbolism and modes 
of secrecy, present in magical traditions, for instance. In early modern Europe, also hieroglyphs were considered 
symbolical, which meant: ‘Of the symbolical, one sort directly conveys its meaning by imitation; another sort is 
written as it were metaphorically; while the remaining sort speaks allegorically as it were by means of aenigmas’ 
(A passage from Clemens of Alexandria, quoted in Horapollo, 1840, pp. 169-170). In Kircher’s case, these 
techniques are particularly prominent because he consciously adapted many different traditions as regards 
analogical reasoning (e.g. the Christian allegorical tradition, Lullism, Platonic analogies, Pythagorean harmony 
theory, Cabbala).  
8 Different overviews of the general contents and structure of Kirchers Ars Magna can be found in Bach (1985), 
Cassanelli (1986), Ianniello (1986), Chevalley (1987) and Corradino (1993). For the Magnes and magnetism, see 
Hine (1982), Baldwin (1987), Hine (1988) and Baldwin (2001). 
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Word and image 
 
The Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae, Kircher’s magnum opus on light and shadow, is divided 
into 10 books, which are meant to correspond to the 10 Zephiroth. These are, according to the 
Cabbala, the 10 mystical stages in the emanation from God.9 Kircher also calls his books the 
10 strings which make up the universal harmony, the Harmonia Decachordi.10 After the 
enumeration of the chapters, he concludes with a quotation from Psalm 134: ‘…in decachordo 
psalterio psallam tibi’ (for you, God, we play on a ten-stringed cithara). The structure of 
Kircher’s book thus follows the structure of the universe, and if we let these chapters ‘sound’ 
simultaneously, if we relate their different styles and subjects, we might hear something of the 
universal harmony.11  
Kircher’s Ars Magna deals with all kinds of knowledge related to light and shadow, most 
prominently optics and gnomonics. The first two books of the Ars Magna are rather 
theoretical. The first considers the nature of light, shadow and colours, together with the 
structure of the sun, moon and planets. The second book elaborates a general theory of 
radiation, after the paradigm of light and optics,12 by which many natural effects, such as 
                                                 
9 Kircher (1671, Ad Lectorem). The oeuvre of Gershom Scholem and Moshe Idel has excellent accounts of the 
Cabbala. For the Zephiroth, see Scholem (1978, p. 96). The theoretical foundation of the Cabbala was largely 
influenced by Neo-Platonism and its theory of emanation. In Kircher, we find a new mix of these traditions. In 
the Ad Lectorem, the metaphysical epilogue is equated with the Cabbalist Ensuph, the infinite and inexplicable 
God from whom the ten Zephiroth/chapters emanate. Traditionally, the tripartite Cabbalist Ensuph resembled the 
Christian trinity and was also explained by means of light metaphors (Scholem, 1978, pp. 88-96).   
10 After the table of contents, he summarizes the structure of the book: Harmonia Decachordi, sive idea operis 
decupartiti.  
11 It is at first difficult to see these assertions as something more than empty rhetoric, attempting to appropriate 
subjects like applied mathematics, natural philosophy and artificial magic to a religious framework. Kircher’s 
work is full of ambiguities and there is no obvious relation between these metaphysical precepts, the ordering of 
the book and the metaphysical and structural elements in his other work (the chapters do not correspond in an 
evident way to the 10 decachords or enneachords of the Musurgia Universalis (Kircher, 1650, synopsis and II 
pp. 392-4), for instance, or to the 10 ‘Zephiroth’ in the Magnes). Nevertheless, Kircher makes many cross-
references throughout his works, connecting different disciplines by means of analogies and discussing the same 
theories or objects in different contexts. Also the structural similarities between magnetism, light, musical 
harmonies and mathematical properties were crucial for Kircher. 
12 See e.g. Lindberg (1976, pp. 94-103) and Lindberg (1983, pp. xxxv-liii) for such theories. Roger Bacon and 
Grosseteste, who are the focus of Lindberg’s discussion, are not mentioned by Kircher however. Kircher rather 
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sympathy and antipathy, are explained. Instruments such as the camera obscura and 
perspective devices are also touched on. The other books of the volume are filled with 
directions for constructing all kinds of instruments. Books 3-6 deal primarily with clocks, but 
also with astrolabes and horoscopes. Books 7-8 are on ‘reflected’ and ‘refracted astronomy’ 
respectively (but clocks still loom large),13 book 9 discusses distances and heights (and 
instruments to measure them), and book 10, the Magic of Light and Shadow, deals with the 
hidden effects of light and shadow and their many applications, containing the most curious 
devices such as fantastic clocks, metamorphoses-machines (deforming the reflected images of 
the spectators in different ways) and instruments for a new cryptology. The work ends with a 
metaphysical epilogue.  
The Magnes, Kircher’s great work on magnetism, is in many ways similar to the Ars Magna. 
The book is subdivided into three parts: (1) on the nature and properties of the magnet, (2) on 
its applications in astronomy, natural magic, geography, navigation, etc., and (3) on its hidden 
workings throughout the world. This third part is divided into 10 sections, which are again 
associated with the 10 branches of the Cabbalist Zephirotic tree (Kircher, 1654, p. 613).14 The 
ten sections of part three deal with the magnetism of the earth, the planets, the stars, the 
elements, the different parts of the earth, the tides, the plants, medicine, music, love and God. 
Sometimes, the same instruments are described in both the Magnes and the Ars Magna, 
suggesting their interrelatedness. In fact, light and magnetism could be considered similar, 
                                                                                                                                                        
refers to Aristotle, Witelo, Alhazen and Lucretius in his discussion of rays, and to Aguilon and Plotinus in his 
discussion of colours. 
13 ‘Reflected’ and ‘refracted’ astronomy refer to astronomy practiced by means of mirrors and lenses 
respectively, or to the study of cosmological phenomena related to reflection and refraction respectively. The 
former includes sections on the influence of reflected moon rays on the climate on earth, reflection clocks and 
astrolabes; the latter includes the study of atmospheric refraction and discussions of refraction astrolabes and 
clocks.  
14 Godwin (1979, p. 74) also discerns its Zephirothic structure in the antiporta frontispiece of the 1654 edition of 
the Magnes. Kircher later published a small derivative work on magnetism (Kircher, 1667), with yet another 
symbolical frontispiece. This work was divided into three parts (on the magnetism of inanimate, vegetal and 
sentient natures), a ‘trinity’ which was reflected in the make-up of the frontispiece.   
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because each is in itself invisible but has visible effects (light is even the cause of visibility).15 
Their powers are ‘occult’, which made them pre-eminently suitable for constructing wondrous 
instruments, because the non-mechanical and non-manifest working principles of such 
instruments would increase the puzzlement of the spectators even more. According to 
Kircher, light and magnetism also share many analogical applications and metaphorical 
meanings.  
Kircher’s texts are very diverse in topic and style. Notwithstanding the luxuriousness of the 
editions, Kircher aimed at a diversity of readers from all over the world, and his diversity in 
style invited different modes of reading.16 His theoretical sections contain classical learning 
as well as the newest discoveries; in his sections on instruments, construction instructions ar
interspersed with anecdotes, emblems and indications of possible contexts of application; and 
his metaphysics is meant for a public steeped in theology, Neo-Platonism and Hermetic 
philosophy. The shifts in different styles and expected modes of reading is tailored to a 
diverse public, including nobles, courtiers, mathematicians, natural philosophers, 
experimental philosophers, instrument builders and artisans connected to the courts (because 
of the price of the books), members of religious orders, theologians, wealthy students etc.  
e 
                                                
Also the use of his figures is varied, as can be seen in his use of diagrams, tables, and 
schemes. He chose rather schematic figures for his ‘naturalistic’ representations of 
astronomical objects, and his more detailed depictions of the moon’s surface were crude 
 
15 See e.g. Kircher (1671, p. 691): ‘… quam magnetici radii habent ad lucidos radios affinitatem, & 
analogiam,…’ assuming the link to be already evident. See also the associations in the epilogues and 
introductions in both books, such as the explanation of the title of the Ars Magna Lucis & Umbrae: ‘Magnam 
dicimus, ob occultam quandam ad Magnetem allusionem.’ Kircher (1671, Ad Lectorem). 
16 In a letter to his publisher, Kircher states that his Jesuits network distributed his books over the whole world 
(including Africa and the Americas) and indicates the number of copies for the different countries. Kircher to 
Joannes Jansson van Waesberghe, no place, undated (draft), APUG 561, f. 079r, ID 1428. For the reception of 
Kircher in the New World and in China, see section V in Findlen (2004a). On Kircher’s publishers, there is some 
information collected in a (curious) volume by Hein (1993). On the publishers van Waesberge, who had an 
exclusive contract with Kircher since 1661, see van Eeghen (1960-1978, IV, pp. 153-167). Probably, this 
exclusive contact has deeply affected Kircher’s scholarship and publishing strategies (cf. Fletcher, 1986, p. 137). 
For a short description of Kircher’s books with some bibliographic information, see Merrill (1989). On books 
and patronage in a Jesuit context, see Baldwin (2003). 
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copies of Francesco Fontana’s moon maps. His images were even more stylised when the aim 
was not to describe but to point at structural characteristics, employing the characteristic faces 
of sun and moon, as in his drawings of the cast shadows of the planets.17 Mathematical 
diagrams alternated with depictions of instruments, but there was an enormous variation in the 
style of the latter. Some were simple and schematic woodcuts, others were elaborate etchings, 
often full of symbolic and heraldic meanings (Fig. 2 versus Fig. 3). Some of these were 
assembled on a white background, stressing their artificial or schematic character, sometimes 
accompanied by a disembodied eye to indicate their use (Fig. 4). Others were presented in a 
landscape or were part of a broader setting, sometimes giving a naturalistic impression, 
sometimes stressing the unnatural character of the device, which is presented floating in front 
of the picture (Fig. 3). 
By rendering his instruments in so many different ways, Kircher appealed to a diversified 
readership and claimed authority in many realms. His abstract depictions could appeal to a 
public of mathematicians, while images rendered in a more concrete fashion might persuade 
potential instrument builders and should provide them with more details. Kircher also tried to 
convince his readers of the reality of some of his artefacts by depicting them in meticulous 
detail in a particular setting. Some of his figures claim authority or objectivity by following 
certain pictorial conventions, others are clearly meant to gratify or should be seen as an 
alignment with the religious or political opinion of his supposed readers. It is clear from Fig. 
3 for instance, that he attempted to gratify his patrons by means of embellishments and 
emblematic references. Kircher’s figures invite as many kinds of spectatorship as his texts 
invite modes of reading. 
 
                                                 
17 For Kircher’s picture of the moon, see Kircher (1671, pp. 9-10); for the stylised images, Kircher (1671, pp. 3, 
6). On Kircher’s borrowings from Fontana and other selenographers, see van de Vyver (1971). 
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The artefacts 
 
Kircher’s museum at the Collegio Romano, a ‘theatre of nature and art’ (De Sepibus, 1678, 
frontispiece), contained many of the instruments described in his books. The extant 
descriptions of his museum give us some insight into the nature of the collection, which 
included not only several kinds of clocks, ingenious fountains, barometers, burning mirrors, 
perspective machines and anamorphoses, but also perpetual-motion machines, optical tricks, a 
mermaid’s tail, the bones of a giant and a host of other natural and artificial marvels.18 Some 
of his instruments had obvious uses: some had practical utility, such as the clocks or land 
surveying devices; others were useful for mathematical research and experimental practice, 
such as his machines to measure the distance between sun and earth. Kircher usually 
explained the uses of the instruments described in his books, and it is obvious that some of his 
measurements are the result of his own application of them. Some of his devices were more 
ambiguous however. Kircher’s portable inclinometer, for instance, was too fragile to survive 
long voyages and was not really useful, despite Kircher’s claims to the contrary (Baldwin, 
1987, p. 257). The depiction of the inclinometer in Kircher’s books (See Fig. 7 and Kircher 
1654, pp. 307-311), however, might have been more instrumental because it visualised the 
need for a community of natural philosophers sharing data on a worldwide scale. Kircher’s 
illustrations of perspectival devices (Fig. 2) might have been purely pictoral instruments, as 
they could not have been used as they were drawn. Massey (2003) has argued that many 
                                                 
18 Kircher often describes in his books the instruments of his museum and extols them above those in other 
collections. We cannot be sure, however, that all his illustrations had an equivalent in his museum, and if so, 
they did not necessarily look the same. The relation between description, illustration and artefact is complex and 
depended on the production process, on the patron and on the aim of the author. Concerning Kircher’s artefacts, 
there are (aside Kircher’s own texts) several catalogues or descriptions by his pupils (Schott, 1657; Schott, 1667; 
Kestler, 1680; Buonanni, 1709; De Sepibus, 1678), visitors’ reactions in letters, descriptions in travel guides, and 
documents of experiments and discussions evoked by these instruments. On Kircher’s instruments, see esp. 
Gorman (2001) and Hankins and Silverman (1995). For Kircher’s musical instruments, see Gouk (1999, passim) 
and Gouk (2001). On Kircher’s museum, see Casciato, Ianniello and Vitale (1986), Findlen (2003), Sardo (2001) 
and Bartola (2004). For the tradition of artificial marvels (‘artificial’ or ‘mathematical’ magic), see Zetterberg 
(1976). For the context of musea and collecting in seventeenth-century Italy, see Findlen (1996). 
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drawings of perspective machines were meant to show what perspective was, as a visual aid to 
the theory, and were not really representations of artefacts to be used by artists.  
Other instruments have to be interpreted in the light of the inter-medial spectacles already 
mentioned. Kircher’s museum was also aptly called a ‘theatre’. It was a place where his 
collection was shown and demonstrated to the courtly visitors; it was a ‘tourist attraction’ for 
those visiting Rome, and many prominent figures from all over the world were lured into 
paying Kircher a visit. Even the instruments with a practical utility were now embedded in a 
context of Baroque spectacle, in which natural objects, artefacts, texts and images were 
employed for the divertissement of the public. Kircher even staged real shows, which were so 
amazing that he was sometimes accused of sorcery. It is this particular context and ‘use’ of his 
instruments, which constitutes their meaning. Kircher characterised his magical instruments 
as serving both entertainment and utilitarian purposes,19 and indeed, relating his devices to the 
courtly culture of wonder and illusionism explains a good deal; but even granted all this, a lot 
of mystery remains (cf. Vermeir, 2005).  
According to our present-day judgement, many renaissance and early-modern instruments 
could never have ‘worked’, and it remains puzzling why they were invented, drawn and 
sometimes even made. One might explain away Leonardo’s ‘proto-aircrafts’ by taking them 
as immature attempts at constructing a device for flying, but this is more difficult with the 
perpetual motion machines that were actually demonstrated. Some of Kircher’s instruments 
did not ‘function’ either, frustrating those who tried to construct them after the descriptions 
and images in Kircher’s books.20 It is clear that even pragmatic notions such as ‘utility’, ‘to 
work’ and ‘to function’ have to be rethought if we want to grasp the meaning of Kircher’s 
                                                 
19 E.g. Kircher (1671, p. 734) writes in his section on ‘catoptrical magic’: ‘Invenientur hic, sive usum publicum, 
sive privatam Principum recreationem spectes, innumera a nemine, quod sciam, hucusque tradita.’ 
20 See e.g. Gorman (2001, pp. 24-25; and 1998, ch. 7). An example is Westleius, a Nuremberg optician who had 
spent more than thousand pounds in unsuccessful attempts of replicating some of Kircher’s ‘optic speculations’ 
(Gorman, 1998, p. 225). 
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instruments. Even if such instruments were only meant to be shown off, it remains a question 
what was meant to be shown.  
Hankins and Silverman (1995, pp. 14-36) have tried to explain Kircher’s aim in building and 
demonstrating instruments that could not possibly have ‘worked’, such as his sunflower seed- 
and magnetic clocks, stating that Kircher wanted to ‘illustrate’ (by trickery) the effects of a 
natural celestial magnetism.21 Other Kircherian instruments are baffling because of their 
seemingly religious contentiousness. What are we to make of an illusory resurrection or 
ascension of Christ devised by optical trickery? (Kircher, 1671, p. 781) How should we 
interpret his kites in the form of angels, to be used on Ascension Day (Kircher, 1671, p. 724)? 
What about his staging of a whale, swallowing Jonas by magnetic means (Kircher, 1631, p. 50 
and 1654, p. 265), or a mechanical clock, sounding every half hour the tune of the Maria 
hymn Ave Maris stella (De Sepibus, 1678, p. 3)? Or consider a machine consisting of a large 
crystalline globe full of water representing the resurrection of the Saviour in the midst of the 
waters (Ibid.); or a Christ walking on water, and bringing help to Peter, who is gradually 
sinking, by a magnetic trick. Kircher also explains this trick: ‘A strong magnet must be placed 
in Peter’s breast, and the hands of Christ, stretched out to come to the rescue, or any part of 
his toga turned toward Peter should be made of excellent steel, and you will have everything 
required to exhibit the story […] This will happen with greater artifice if the statue of Christ is 
flexible in its middle, for in this way it will bend itself, to the vast admiration and piety of the 
spectators’.22  
                                                 
21 Kircher stated that he had made a clock with a sunflower, by propping it up a big piece of cork. After putting it 
in a basin of water, the sunflower was unhampered in following the course of the sun, and indicated the time on a 
surrounding scale. Kircher also made clocks with sunflower seeds only. These clocks also worked if the sun was 
behind the clouds, Kircher claimed, because the sun attracted the flower and its seeds by a celestial magnetic 
power. For other assessments of Kircher’s magnetic and sunflower clocks, see Bedini (1969), Fletcher (1970), 
Drake (1967), Baldwin (1987, pp. 221-228) and Hine (1988). 
22 Kircher (1631, p. 51) (see also Kircher 1654, p. 265): ‘In pectore Petri ponatur validum magnetis fructum, 
manus vero Christi ad succurrendum extensae aut qualiscumque togae pars, Petrum respiciens ex optimo chalybe 
confectae sint, & habebis omnia ad historiam exhibendam requisita. […] quod maiori artificio fiet si statua 
Christi in medio fuerit flexilis, sic enim incuruabit sese summa cum intuentium & admiratione, & pietate.’ 
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As unsuspecting readers, used to twenty-first century modes of religiosity, we can easily 
sympathise with Michael John Gorman’s question: ‘How could Kircher dare to make a joke 
of the central mystery of Christianity? How could he place the resurrected Christ in a glass 
sphere, alongside genies, water-vomiting snakes and pagan Goddesses?’ (Gorman, 2001, pp. 
26-7). Notwithstanding the success of an inter-medial approach in placing many of Kircher’s 
artefacts in their proper context, some of his instruments remain puzzling. Even if we are 
aware of a context characterised by Catholicism and by a preference for spectacle, even if we 
know how the objects functioned and how they were ‘used’, our confused response to these 
artefacts indicates that we still lack any clear sense of their ‘meaning’. It will turn out to be 
necessary to cast our net wider and to bring in an analysis of Kircher’s metaphysics.  
 
Metaphysics 
 
In both Ars Magna and Magnes, the body of the text, with its descriptions of mathematical 
and natural philosophical theories and instruments, is framed by a metaphysical frontispiece 
and a metaphysical epilogue.23 This prominent placing at the beginning and end suggests that 
the whole work has a metaphysical bearing. The frontispiece of the Ars Magna shows the 
emanation of light from its divine source (symbolised by the tetragrammaton) to the world, 
linking God with the instruments that receive the light (Fig. 5). God is the source of the divine 
light, which is not directly visible (the clouds) but radiates downwards to the sublunar. Only 
the nine orders of angels are in direct contact with God, but together with the clouds, they 
obscure the divine light. The different kinds of background (a division between backgrounds 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kircher (1654, p. 360) claims that Caspar Ens (1636, pp. 117-120) had copied some of his ideas from Kircher 
(1631), which indicates that Kircher’s machines were also popular in the context of mathematical recreations. 
23 For background on Kircher’s metaphysics of light and magnetic theology, see Marquet (1983), Bach (1985, 
pp. 275-305), Baldwin (1987, pp. 453-464) and Leinkauf (1993, pp. 324-342). See Benz (1970) and Fara (1996, 
pp. 185-193) for eighteenth-century instances of the use of electricity and magnetism in religious metaphors and 
theological discourse.  
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is clearly visible between the peacock and the eagle) distinguish between the archetypal, 
sideral and sublunar spheres. The male figure at the left, blazing with rays of light or fire, 
symbolises the sun. The signs of the zodiac are painted on his body, a classical way of 
representing the Zodiac man and the microcosm-macrocosm relationship. He also holds 
Hermes’ rod with the signs of the five planets inscribed between the circular twists of the two 
snakes and with the ‘vivifying eye of heaven’ on top. The dark female figure at the right 
represents the ‘lunar mirror’. She holds a staff with Minerva’s owl (the animal of dusk and 
night) and is ‘pregnant with the stars’.24  
Both the sun (symbol of Phoebus-Apollo and Hermes as well as of God, Christ and the 
Angels) and the moon (Phoebe, the virgins Mary, Artemis-Diana and Athena-Minerva, as 
well as the Angels and Man), flanked by a two-headed eagle and peacock respectively 
(symbols of the Habsburgs and optics)25 take a prominent place in the heavens. They send and 
reflect light to the earth, which is received by measuring instruments (a moondial and a 
‘mirror-dial’ in a grotto – cf. Kircher (1671, p. 555)). A landscape with a sundial (time 
measurement), a garden (generation) and ships (navigation), displaying the benefits derived 
from light, are depicted in the background. Behind all this, the rainbow symbolises the 
(luminous and colourful) bridge between heaven and earth, the covenant between God and 
man (Gen. 9:12-16). Although the divine light can only be perceived on earth through the 
                                                 
24 Much of this symbolism derives from Ficino’s text De Sole, to which Kircher’s metaphysics of light was 
greatly indebted. For the ‘vivifying eye of heaven’ and the ‘lunar mirror’, see Ficino (1959a, pp. 968, 967 
respectively). Referring to the Hymns of Orpheus, he also writes that ‘The Sun is the eternal eye that sees all 
things’ and ‘The Moon is pregnant with the stars; the Moon is queen of the stars’ (Ibid., p. 968). The Zodiac man 
is a traditional medical-astrological image representing the influences of the heavens on the different parts of the 
body. On a more general level it symbolises the microcosm-macrocosm connection. Ficino (Ibid., p. 968) writes: 
‘so the virtues of all heavenly things are brought down to the limbs from the Sun via the Moon, to be nurtured 
through medicines ritually prepared at that particular time’ (see also Ficino’s De Vita Libri Tres). The zodiac is 
the path of the sun trough the heavens and Ficino’s (1959a, p. 966) statement ‘Through the twelve signs of the 
zodiac, it [the sun] is called living’ might be an additional explanation of the signs of the zodiac on the sun’s 
body. 
25 Hermes slew the vigilant and sharp-eyed Argus, who had to guard Io from the amorous Zeus/Jupiter. In order 
to honour him, Hera/Juno transposed Argus’s hundred eyes to the peacock’s tail (Ovid, 1994, p. 52). The 
peacock came to stand for optics and enhanced sight. The story is beautifully rendered in Rubens’ Juno and 
Argus (1611), a painting which is claimed to illustrate the optical theories his Jesuit friend, the Antwerp 
mathematician François de Aguilon, later expounded in the latter’s Opticorum libri sex (Aguilon, 1613; 
Parkhurst, 1961, pp. 45-46). 
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various reflections and refractions displayed in the frontispiece, it is clear that natural 
philosophical and mathematical pursuits here on earth are intimately linked with metaphysics 
and theology. Kircher also visualises the four sources of knowledge, sacred authority (with 
divine illumination), the eye of reason (with intellectual illumination), the senses (symbolised 
by the telescopic projection of physical sunlight on a page, the standard way to observe the 
sun) and profane authorities (with a little illumination from a lamp), and he gives them their 
proper place in the cosmic hierarchy.26  
The frontispiece of the Magnes shows the divine eagle, holding up the entire cosmic system 
and/or body of knowledge, with theology on top (Fig.6). The Judeo-Christian God was often 
associated with an eagle (in the Torah and the Bible, e.g. Deut. 32, 11) and he sometimes 
assumed the symbolism of Jupiter, His pagan equivalent. The chains symbolise the hidden 
magnetic interactions and equivalences between the disciplines (cf. the decachord in the Ars 
Magna), and connect them to the microcosm and the sideral, sublunar and archetypal worlds, 
in the middle of the frontispiece.27 These chains refer to the magnetic rings in Plato’s Ion, 
which symbolise the divine inspiration transmitted by poets to their interpreters and spectators 
(Plato, 1997, pp. 941-943), as well as to the traditional theme of the great chain of being (cf. 
Lovejoy, 1936).28 The banner states ‘Omnia nodis arcanis connexa quiescunt’ (all things 
linked by arcane knots are at rest), and suggests that the arcane magnetic forces hold 
everything in harmonious equilibrium according to the divine plan. The divine hands hold the 
chains which connect worldly and divine power (crown and imperial globe) symbolised by 
palm branches (faith) and swords (power). On top of these two chains, the inscription ‘occult 
                                                 
26 Bach (1985, pp. 197-207) provides us with the first coherent attempt of interpreting some of Kircher’s 
frontispieces in their context. More on the tradition of the four sources of knowledge can be found in Ashworth 
(1989).  
27 The mentioned disciplines are: theology, philosophy, physics, poesis, rhetoric, cosmography, mechanics, 
perspectives, astronomy, music, geography, arithmetic, natural magic and medicine.  
28 It might also refer to Augustine’s (1955, XXI, 4) description of a magnetised chain, which was later 
interpreted in a devotional way, and to Thomas Aquinas’ (1953) Catena aurea.  
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power’ on a magnetic stone identifies the nature of the bond, relegating the power of the Holy 
Roman Emperor to a ‘magnetic’ interaction. 
The epilogue of the Magnes examines the source of all magnetic interaction, being the 
foundation of the ‘magnetic chain’ that connects everything in the ‘theatre of nature’. 
Everything emanates from the universal nature God, ‘the central magnet of all things’. It is 
then diffused by means of divine rays, from which the order of the created universe springs 
(represented in the 10 sections/Zephiroth).29 This ‘central Magnet’ is identified with the 
divine Trinity: its attractive power with the Father; its ordering capacities with the Son (the 
Word or Wisdom); and its connective power with the Holy Spirit (divine Love). These powers 
are of course never really separable, constituting a tripartite unity.30 Then the different stages 
of the emanation are explored in both directions. The ascending movement passes from the 
first form, through the intermediary elemental, mineral, vegetable, sensible, imaginary, 
rational, intellectual stages, to the divine Mind and Wisdom, both source and pole of 
attraction of the whole movement. It is the divine Wisdom that exerts a magnetizing attraction 
for man’s disquieted soul.31  
Kirchers metaphysics of light, expounded in the epilogue of the Ars Magna (Epilogus, sive 
Metaphysica Lucis & Umbrae), is similar but much more complex. Here, Kircher could rely 
on a long tradition of light metaphysics, and his explanations, excursions and analogies 
                                                 
29 On God as the central magnet, see Kircher (1654, table of contents): ‘Deum rerum omnium centralis magnes’. 
On the emanations, the magnetic chains and the Zephiroth, see Kircher (1654, p. 613). The use of the magnet as 
a metaphor for God and divine love, and even the first onsets to a ‘magnetic theology’, can also be found in other 
seventeenth-century works. See especially Fludd (1638, pp. 250r-250v), Ward (1640), Boyle (1659, pp. 103-
105), Silesius (1675, II.2, III.132, V.130); and Hale (1695). Kircher’s Magnes, however, is the most powerful 
exponent of this tradition. Kircher’s other works on magnetism also conclude with reflections on the divine 
magnet (Kircher, 1631, pp. 61-63; Kircher, 1667, pp. 129-130).  
30 In order to exist, every being has need of such a tripartite magnetic principle: ‘Unde omnis res, ut habeat esse, 
& tale esse in quo est, opus habet unitrino principio magnetico attrahente, disponente, & connectente.’ Kircher 
(1654, p. 614) This can be interpreted to correspond with the three parts of the Magnes: 1. explanation of the 
essence and power of the magnet, 2. applications or ordering, 3. the connective/magnetic chain. 
31 Kircher (1654, p. 615): ‘Mirum non est, si in omni humanae vitae conversatione anima inquieta, nullo alio nisi 
in ipsa quiescere possit, ex qua, in qua, & per quam omnis illa, quam desiderare homo potest, felicitas est, 
unicum desiderij sui complementum, principium, medium, & finis. Ad hunc igitur aeternitatis Magnetem uti 
omnia, ita potissimum mens nostra, ceu ferrum ad magnetem, a quo vitam meret, & gratiam, beatitatemque, 
ardentissime fertur.’ 
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became more diversified.32 God is now identified with an infinite incorruptible light, from 
which everything comes into being. This metaphysics is based on the authority of Prisca 
Theologia and Platonist philosophers, but Kircher asserts that the Christian Theologians 
adapted these theories to the ‘sacrament’ of the Trinity. Subsequently, Kircher identifies the 
Father with the infinite eternal Light (the sun’s natural and invisible fecundity), the Son with 
the emission of this light (the manifest light and its radiation and brilliance), and the Holy 
Spirit with the heat produced, which nourishes the whole universe with its warmth. The sun is 
the visible symbol of this invisible ‘tripartite’ Light. Again, different grades of being are 
discerned, emanating from this original Light (equated with the ‘Archetypal world’, the 
Platonist world of ideas, and with the ‘Paternal abyss’), each of which retains some of the 
original light, causing the chain to fade gradually into darkness.33 
After identifying the original Light with the Trinity, Kircher cites the creation story of the 
Pimander (this is Ficino’s translation of the Corpus Hermeticum, a Hellenistic compilation of 
texts thought to be written by the Ancient sage Hermes Trismegistus).34 Because of the 
incorrect dating of the Corpus Hermeticum, these allegedly pre-biblical semi-Christian 
revelations from the time of Moses assumed great authority, notwithstanding their sometimes 
                                                 
32 Kircher does not name his direct sources, but I think that his metaphysics of light is most indebted to Bovillus’ 
Liber de intellectu and Liber de sapiente (Bovillus, 1510, esp. pp. 3r-8r and 139v-145v) as well as to Ficino’s De 
Sole and De Lumine (Ficino, 1959b) and other Ficinian works. Also the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh of 
St. Victor and Cusanus looms large. In a more remote way, Kircher is indebted to a long tradition figuring 
luminaries like Plato, Proclus, Plotinus, the Corpus Hermeticum, the Chaldean Oracles and the Orphic Hymns, 
but also more recent authors such as Scotus Eriugena, Patrizi, Lefèvre d’Etaples and Fludd. For more general 
discussions of the tradition of the metaphysics of light, see esp. Hugedé (1957), Hedwig (1980), Lindberg (1986) 
and Scheuerman-Peilicke (2000). 
33 The idea of ‘vestigia Trinitatis’, the traces or footprints of the Trinity that one could find all over the created 
world, was part of a long tradition. See e.g. Augustine (1968, VI, X.12), Hugh of St. Victor (1879c) and Bovillus 
(1510, pp. 134r-136v), who argued that signs of the Trinity can be found everywhere in nature. Also Kepler 
(1604, p. 6), who is more respected as a ‘scientist’ today, believed just like Kircher that the nature of light 
expressed the Divine Trinity.  
34 The theology of the ancient wise men was thought to prefigure Christian theology. These Prisca Theologia 
could not have been rescued by Christ, and could not have perceived revealed truth. On the other hand, since the 
original knowledge from before the flood got corrupted during the ages, their ancient wisdom and knowledge 
contained many truths that were obscured in later times. Following on the work of Frances Yates (2002), a whole 
debate on ‘Hermetism’ and ‘Hermeticism’ has ensued, and the influence of Hermetic texts (in contrast to Neo-
Platonic and other texts, for instance) on the development of science and on Renaissance culture in general has 
often been overstated. For a critique of the concepts ‘Hermetism’ and ‘Hermeticism’, see e.g. Copenhaver (1988, 
pp. 83, 93, 96 n.27) and Copenhaver (1990, p. 289). 
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unorthodox character. Although the dating was corrected by Isaac Casaubon in 1614, Kircher 
chose to ignore this in order to create a unified picture of an ‘original’ and pure religion, 
based on ancient Hermetic and Egyptian (hieroglyphic) sources.35 In the creation story in the 
Pimander, Christian and Gnostic elements are merged: the creation originates in the 
interaction between Light and Darkness, and the Son is identified with the ‘craftsman’ or 
demiurge who shaped the universe; man too is granted creative powers and becomes a magus-
craftsman. Notwithstanding his interest in and sympathy for artificial magic, Kircher avoided 
the heterodox passage on the demiurge in his discussion and interprets the threefold 
movement in this creation narrative as the Trinity. Kircher struggles to give an orthodox 
presentation of Hermes, and tries to relate light and darkness in an abstruse way, by 
describing the progressive unfolding of the light, which checks itself before emanating again; 
it radiates and recoils, with the surrounding darkness as its frontier. All these characteristics 
are related to the properties of physical light, and for Kircher, this theological significance 
legitimises ‘optics’ as a subject of elaborate study.  
Light metaphors were abundant in the Christian tradition, particularly in Augustinian light-
epistemology and Christian mysticism, but also in the Bible (notably Paul and John) and the 
writings of the Jesuit founding father, Ignatius of Loyola. In Kircher’s text, references to these 
traditions are intermingled with Aristotelian, Platonic and Hermetic elements, and this mix 
leads to terminological obscurity and ambiguities in classifications. His text constantly shifts 
almost imperceptibly between physics, cosmogony, cosmology, epistemology, eschatology, 
metaphysics, mysticism and theology. Although useful for analytical reasons, these 
distinctions are misleading since all these strands are inseparably intertwined in Kircher’s 
metaphysics of light. Both theology and cosmogony, for instance, are phrased in terms of the 
                                                 
35 See esp. Eco (1993, ch. 7) and Stolzenberg (2003) for Kircher’s studies of the hieroglyphs. Kircher differed in 
his use of the Hermetic philosophy from Bruno in his belief that these languages and images were not to be used 
as magical symbols, but he treated them as expressions of religious and metaphysical convictions. Kircher 
condemned the practice of most forms of magic, except of course natural and artificial magic. Astrology and 
alchemy were restricted within narrow limits.  
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spherical propagation of (physical) light from a point-source (cf. Fig. 9). His neo-platonic 
metaphysics of emanation, divided into emanation, receiving and returning, has also a moral 
and eschatological significance, because it is the goal of all beings to ascend this scale of 
perfection.36 This is also the scale ascended by the mystics to attain a visio dei. A notable 
aspect of his metaphysics is his identification of angels and man with mirrors and lenses, 
which reflect or refract the divine light downwards to the earth.37 The phenomenal world is 
then full of shadows, reflecting only other reflections, in which every original is lost. As Paul 
already wrote: ‘For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face’ (1 Cor. 13,12). 
Indeed, the ascent to God by means of contemplation is also a luminary process, according to 
Kircher, but it is hampered by shadows and distortions of the intermediary angelic mirrors 
(since during our earthly life, God cannot be seen directly). 
The continuous ambiguity in Kircher’s descriptions allows him to integrate different traditions 
in what I would call a ‘unity without unification’, and it also allows him to draw schemes of 
correspondences, without having to worry much about consistency. The Tropologia Lucis & 
Umbrae, the last section of the book, placed after the metaphysical epilogue, well illustrates 
this.38 Kircher starts off again with the famous Hermetic characterisation of God, the Light, as 
the ‘mystical sphere’, of which the circumference is nowhere and the centre everywhere. The 
Trinity is again evoked and the Zodiac is characterised as the twelve emanations of the divine 
virtues or attributes. Then, the creatures are revealed to be the shadows of the clothes of God, 
as Rambam (Maimonides) teaches, and the mystical meanings of planets and Zodiac are 
                                                 
36 See Kircher (1671, p. 809), where pious souls are propagated in straight lines (cf. light) to God. See also 
Kircher (1654, p. 616), where is explained that impure iron (souls) is not attracted by the magnet (God). In 
classical bible hermeneutics, four levels of meaning were distinguished: 1. literal meaning, 2. a deeper 
epistemological meaning (allegorical and mystical), 3. a deeper moral meaning (tropology), 4. an eschatological 
meaning (anagogy). Tropological and anagogical metaphors and analogies should guide the faithful in the 
practical aspects of their life and in their search for salvation (e.g. by giving rules, or by encouraging imitation 
and meditation).  
37 A similar view can be found in Bovillus (1510, pp. 7r-7v and 140r-140v) already. Bovillus (1510, p. 7r) also 
explains that material mirrors and material light are signs or symbols of immaterial mirrors and light. See also 
e.g. Hugh of St. Victor (1879a, pp. 995a-c) for man as a mirror. Such views legitimise the assignment of 
metaphysical meanings to Kircher’s actual mirror-devices (Vermeir, 2005). 
38 For the notion of tropologia, see note 36. 
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explored. The Sun, for instance, is identified with the Sacrament of the Eucharist, the light of 
the sun is the divine splendour of the militant Church (of which the characteristics are 
explored), but in the end ‘the only Sun is Christ, the only moon the Mother of God [Deipara], 
protectors of this mystical world’.39  
The abundance and richness of the cosmos, so I presume, does not allow for one coherent 
classification. Nevertheless, it is clear that Kircher’s diversity of metaphors, analogies and 
characterisations of God and the universe has the advantage of connecting everything in a 
(magnetic) chain of associations. For Kircher, the metaphysics of light, the theory of universal 
harmony, magnetic theology or his hieroglyphic theology are all ways to express a similar 
message.40 The radiation of light from a point-source is more suited to express an emanation, 
and illumination metaphors have always been popular in epistemology and mysticism. The 
magnet, on the other hand, is outstanding for symbolising the divine love and attraction. 
Kircher’s aim to construct a unified religion, based on the old wisdom of the Prisca 
Theologia, also resulted in the patching together of so many traditions, concepts and 
terminologies. Kircher’s account of Chinese culture,41 his elaboration of the story of Noah’s 
Flood, his quest for a universal language and the lost knowledge of the Prisca Theologia, his 
attempts to understand and describe nature as a divine creation, and his various other pursuits 
also contribute to this overarching aim of a unified religion, and find their legitimation in it. In 
the abstraction of his metaphysics, and by means of its powerful analogical and combinatory 
                                                 
39 Kircher (1671, pp. 806-7): ‘Per Solem, si quid per aliud, certe luculentur significatur Sacrosanctum 
Eucharistiae Sacramentum, vena vitae, [...] Quid vero per uniformiter difformem Solis lucem aliud indicatur, nisi 
huius militantis Ecclesiae divinus splendor [...] Unicus autem Sol Christus, unica Luna Deipara, mundi huius 
mystici praesides.’ 
40 See esp. Kircher (1671, pp. 795-810), Kircher (1650, II pp. 364-462), Kircher (1654, pp. 613-618) and Kircher 
(1652-1655, II, pp. 497-546) for the respective ‘metaphysics’ or ‘theology’. In the Christian tradition, with its 
well developed hermeneutical apparatus, both the bible and the world could be read on different levels without 
any real discrepancy. Therefore, antiquarianism as well as natural philosophy and mathematics could fit 
seamlessly in a broader metaphysical and theological framework, without precluding diligence and competence 
in all these areas of scholarship.  
41 It was part of the controversial Jesuit programme of ‘accommodation’ to integrate Christian practices into 
traditional Chinese customs and beliefs (cf. the rites controversy). The borders of orthodoxy and heterodoxy 
were continuously negotiated by the Jesuits, and they were heavily criticised for that by other Christians. One 
could say that for Kircher, this principle also ranged backwards in time, in order to accommodate ancient 
Egyptians and other cultures too. On Jesuit ‘accommodation’, see e.g. Mungello (1985) and Billings (2004).  
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tools, different kinds of knowledge and divergent religions could be reconciled and merged. 
Ultimately, this made his metaphysics the focal point of all his other activities. 
 
Utility and entertainment? 
 
The idea emerges that Kircher’s oeuvre, this unity without unification, abounds in different 
ways of proclaiming an overarching message. His use of texts, figures and artefacts all have to 
be included and integrated to hear his harmonious chord of different meanings – religious, 
moral, political, philosophical, experimental, technical, artistic,... – working together to fulfil 
the Jesuit ideology. In an important paper, Harris (1989) has tried to identify this ideology and 
its interest for the history of science.42 He stressed the importance of the Jesuit ‘apostolic 
spirituality’, the values necessary for an active (apostolic) life in the service to God. A long 
and exacting period of ascetic and intellectual formation served to inculcate these values, 
which resulted in a deep sense of commitment to the ideological movement. Harris argued 
that this also influenced their intellectual beliefs, since their ideas could incorporate and give 
expression to their ideological values. The result was an ‘image of knowledge’, which – using 
a nice Kircherian metaphor – served as a cognitive lens that focused and filtered the 
intellectual energy of the members of the Society (Harris, 1989, pp. 46-47). 
All knowledge was assessed on its utility to achieve the Jesuits’ religious goals,43 especially 
in their three main areas of activity (the ‘apostolates’): in education, at court, and in the 
foreign missions. Every science (scientia) had to demonstrate its fitness for, and usefulness
the Jesuit program. Efficiency and practicality were obvious criteria; but I would argue that 
 to, 
                                                 
42 For some recent work on Jesuits and the history of science, see e.g. Dear (1995a), Feingold (2003a), Feingold 
(2003b), Feldhay (1987), Feldhay and Heyd (1989), Feldhay (1999) and O’Malley (1999a). See O’Malley 
(1999b) for a recent historiography of the Jesuits.  
43 Harris (1989, note 4): ‘Certainly for the first two hundred years of the Society’s existence – and probably for 
its entire existence – one cannot speak of science as an autonomous cultural activity within the Society. Thus we 
may assume that the methods, practices, and goals of scientific activity within the Society were subservient to its 
religious program.’ See also the conclusion of Hellyer (1999, p. 548). 
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the full meaning of ‘utility’ was not so confined. Of course, the Jesuits tried to strengthen 
their monopoly in education by means of a general focus on knowledge, and their position at 
court could be ensured by catching the nobleman’s attention with wonders (e.g
Wunderkammer, mathematical magic) and useful knowledge (e.g. navigation, fortification). 
As in secular contexts, the curiosities described or displayed by the Jesuits were often 
fantastic and had no direct practical use, although the marvellous and claims for utility were 
frequently intertwined (Fig. 7).
. the 
                                                
44 For the Jesuits, however, both useful knowledge and the 
marvellous could only be means to a higher end. Their education served the propagation of 
Catholic values and beliefs, and although their position at court gave them opportunities as 
preachers and confessors, their grip on society would be much more successful if the Catholic 
values and ideas could be integrated with the transfer of (natural philosophical) knowledge 
and incorporated into their marvellous spectacles. Jesuit mathematics and natural philosophy 
did not only have a practical function, it had to be in tune with their other values and practices 
in order to constitute a real ‘Christian science’. Although Jesuit investigations into the natural 
world were not very different from other approaches at the moment – they were widely 
esteemed as experts in mathematics as well as in natural and even experimental philosophy – 
their work functioned in a broader program and had additional meanings.  
The centre of the Jesuits’ project was the battle for minds and souls, and their practical and 
intellectual pursuits were often a deliberate strategy in this religious program. This evident 
bias in education and research evoked the criticism of many contemporaries. For the Jesuits, 
 
44 The ‘usefulness’ of early-modern instruments was a typical rhetorical trope, but most of the time, these 
instruments were not ‘useful’ in our sense of the word. Recent secondary literature has stressed the importance 
of artefacts and books about technology for the ‘moral economy exclusively concerned with exchanges that 
enhanced the glory and power of the patron and remunerated the client with various material and status benefits’ 
(Long, 2001, p. 243). Pamela Long (ibid.) has tried to counter this view and stressed the genuineness and the 
substantive nature of the knowledge exchanged. Although she is undoubtedly right that we cannot reduce the 
whole of early modern technology to patronage relations, many instruments remain puzzling, ‘unreal’ and 
inexplicable by our modern standards. Many of Kircher’s instruments, as well as some examples in her own 
book, attest of these problems. 
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both studies and active work were a form of prayer – ‘everything is prayer’45 – and I propose 
that we see their texts and artefacts literally as ‘prayers’, as pious contemplations on the 
world, framed in a religious and metaphysical practice. This explains, for instance, the 
importance for Kircher of writing a tract on the marvellous appearance of crosses occurring 
after a volcanic eruption, the Diatribe de Prodigiosis Crucibus (1661). Though these signs 
were natural (instead of miraculous or demonic), Kircher interpreted them as indications of 
the omnipresence of divine providence. From the Jesuit standpoint, it was important to find 
the image of a crucified Christ in a stone, for instance, between the numerous other fossils, 
because it confirmed God’s presence in nature. These stones were signs placed there for 
human discovery, evidence of God’s revelation in the world.46 As the Jesuits construed their 
work as God’s work, they created artificial signs themselves, pointing at this divine presence. 
Also artefacts and new inventions necessarily conformed to the norms and structures of the 
divine universe. The Jesuits organised theatre plays, re-staging the crucial moments in 
Catholic history. In a similar way, their artefacts were meant to re-stage the creation, the 
moral or divine order of the cosmos. These practices, pointing at divine signs, making them 
explicit and interpreting them, were part of the purpose of their natural philosophical and 
experimental activities. It was a way of convincing apostates, and of supporting the faithful 
and glorifying God. 
Of course, the Jesuit sciences cannot be reduced to religion. Mathematical propositions and 
experimental setups cannot be fully ‘explained’ by their religious contexts, nor should we 
endorse contemporary critiques that Jesuit scientia was nothing more than a sneaky way of 
making proselytes, but these religious and apostolic contexts can nevertheless prove crucial in 
                                                 
45 Ignatius (1970, p. 184), cited in Harris (1989, p. 51). 
46 For the Christian tradition to read the world as full of divine signs, see Brinkmann (1980). The Trinity had 
been central to Ignatius of Loyola’s spirituality, and he was always on the lookout for signs from God, which had 
to guide the choices he made. See e.g. his Spiritual Diary and his Autobiography, especially on the system of 
‘election’ and ‘discernment’ (de Nicolas, 1986, pp. 47-60, 135-137, 189-197, 253-255). See also note 33 on the 
‘vestigia Trinitatis’. For the Christian interpretation of fossils, see e.g. Nummedal (2001, p. 41). See also 
Stolzenberg (2001a) and Findlen (1990) on the plays of nature. 
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order to understand the full meaning of the Jesuits’ pursuits. Furthermore, individual Jesuits 
differed in their opinion of how scientific exploits could best serve their religious aims and 
they developed different strategies for serving their order. Kircher’s particular approach, for 
example, was only one (rather spectacular) option in a wide field of possibilities. Therefore, in 
a similar way, Kircher cannot be reduced to his Jesuit identity, although no doubt this identity 
was fundamental to his work. From very early on, his education had taken place in a Jesuit 
setting, characterised by the Ratio Studiorum and the Spiritual Exercises. Patronage relations 
based on the Jesuit network defined his later career. Kircher’s Jesuit identity shaped and 
permeated his work; it co-determined his institutional setting, his access to rare linguistic and 
natural philosophical resources as well as many of his doctrinal allegiances. On the other 
hand, his metaphysical explorations discussed in the previous sections are anything but 
orthodox, and his works frequently provoked negative reports from the Jesuit censors.47 These 
reports, in turn, were often overruled by the Jesuit General, who judged that in this case, 
doctrinal unity was subservient to the publicity and success realised for the Society by means 
of Kircher’s lavish tomes. Despite the formalised and hierarchical structure of the Jesuits, the 
Society cannot be treated as a seamless unity.48 These internal disagreements, as well as 
Kircher’s powerful connections, ranging from Cardinals and Archdukes to the Pope and the 
Holy Roman Emperor, helped to ensure his success and relative independence as an author. 
                                                 
47 Despite their controversial metaphysics, the Magnes and the Ars Magna passed censorship without much 
trouble. The former received approval from Rethi Baptista (ARSI FG 667 609r) and ‘approval with comment’ 
from Giattinus Baptista (ARSI FG 667 610r). The latter received approval from Cripsius Joannes and Rethi 
Baptista (ARSI FG 667 611r and 612r) and ‘approval with comment’ from Inchofer Melchior (ARSI FG 667 
613r), who had played an important role in Galileo’s trial. His later works, however, were more under fire and 
were often disapproved. Sometimes, the reason was unorthodoxy or unclearness (e.g. his pronouncements on 
Copernicanism or atomism). More often, however, Kircher was criticised because of his immodesty and because 
the quality of his works was deemed insufficient. On the Jesuit system of censorship, and on Kircher and his 
censors in particular, see Siebert (2004) and Stolzenberg (forthcoming).  
48 For the intellectual cohesion of the Jesuit order, see esp. Harris (1989). For the standard Aristotelianism and 
Thomism in Jesuit education, see Simmons (1999). For Aristotelianism in the ‘strange context’ of Kircher’s 
work, see Leinkauf (1988). See Feldhay (1987) for Jesuit deviations from traditional Thomism and Feldhay 
(1999) for reflections on the variety of differentiated positions in Jesuit science. 
 25
Nevertheless, Jesuit culture is the most fitting context in relation to which we have to 
understand Kircher’s work, and I think that my interpretation of Jesuit practice, as part of a 
broader Catholic context, may throw light on some of his instruments that have continued to 
baffle modern scholars. Some of Kircher’s instruments can be elucidated, for instance, by 
placing them in the context of the Jesuit apostolic mission. Many of his artefacts could be 
practically employed in convincing and converting people. Take his parastatic smicroscope, 
for example, through which the passion of Christ could be displayed (Fig. 4), or his 
anamorphoses hiding/displaying religious messages. He also made kites in the form of a 
dragon, with IRA DEI inscribed and covered with sulphur, after which he sent the burning 
dragon to the heathen in order to frighten and convert them (Kircher, 1671, p. 724). Kircher’s 
books can be read as catalogues and instruction manuals providing the Jesuits with devices for 
their ‘battle of souls’. But not only the artefacts were intended to be useful, the images in the 
book were also a staging of religious scenes, and were part of Jesuit visual rhetoric. Other 
artefacts, however, cannot be reduced to a simple display of Catholic ‘utility and 
entertainment’, and Kircher’s instruments can be found to hide even more layers of meaning. 
Kircher’s mirror spectacles, for instance, are not only entertaining, but can also be interpreted 
as moral tests, and the perception of layers of different realities hidden behind the veil of 
everyday phenomena created a vertigo in the religious beholder (Kircher, 1671, pp. 775-788). 
In his catoptrical theatres, the world became illusory. One became conscious of one’s life in 
the shadows, where one encountered only reflections and never the things themselves. Every 
reflection was again another step, removing us from the original Light. Even one’s ‘self’ 
crumbled when looking into Kircher’s distorting or scattering mirrors. All sense of place and 
time was lost. Despair and self-reflection, evoked by mirrors, were preconditions for gaining a 
religious insight, for a conversion or for an interaction with the other-worldly. Mirrors had 
also important theological meanings, as can be seen in Jesuit devotional books, and they could 
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offer a glance at the divine forces behind the visible world. On one of the images in David’s 
Duodecim Specula (1610), for instance, two devout people contemplate ‘the invisible through 
the visible’ and see God through a mirror (Fig. 8). Parts of Kircher’s magnetic theology and 
metaphysics of light can be read as a commentary on the latter picture: ‘in these things 
themselves, as if they were a kind of mirrors (or lenses), you will see God.’49 These examples 
suggest again that in order to understand the meaning of some of Kircher’s artefacts, it is 
necessary to bring in his metaphysics.  
 
Applied metaphysics 
 
Let us now recall those allegedly ‘impious’ instruments, seemingly desecrating the most holy 
mysteries: Kircher’s devices to create a magnetic and catoptric resurrection, and his magnetic 
toys re-enacting the rescue of the drowning Peter. Gorman (2001, p. 26), in an otherwise 
brilliant text, remarks: ‘Surely to place the Resurrection in this mechanical context was 
tantamount to reducing it to a secret combination of natural causes and denying its miraculous 
status?’ The point is, however, that it is not a ‘mechanical context’ at all, the crucial element 
being the natural but ‘occult’ or hidden forces of magnetism and light. Both serve as material 
symbols of the divine Magnet or Light. The rescue of Peter by Jesus, re-staged by means of 
iron and magnet, should not be seen as a materialistic profanation. The action of the magnet is 
a symbol of the divine love and faith, attracting both and binding them together (see also fig. 
11). In the epilogue of the Magnes, Christ’s magnetic nature is made explicit: ‘When I shall 
be lift up from the earth, I will draw all things unto myself [John 12,32]. There is indeed 
nobody who does not know how this is fulfilled. Because by means of these magnetic strings 
of the cross, attracted by these fetters, the whole world has followed him presently, and rulers, 
                                                 
49 Kircher (1654, p. 617), see note 59. 
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kings, emperors, leaving their sceptres behind, are attracted by this magnet, and disparaging 
the world, they clung to the Magnet Christ.’50  
The ‘metaphysical’ significance of Kircher’s instruments can be inferred even better from a 
section in the epilogue of the Ars Magna, where Kircher embarks on a metaphysical 
interpretation of the camera obscura. The instrument is evoked in the context of the ascent of 
the soul to God. The soul, ‘immigrant’ in a lower world, suffers from its impurity. It is lost in 
this world of shadows and illusions, which confuses and destabilises it. Searching for its lost 
purity and guided by love (‘that Egyptian Demon’ as Kircher writes),51 it will be raised from 
the lower to the higher. Kircher uses Apuleius’ famous tale of Psychè (soul) and Cupid (love) 
to illustrate this process.52 The tale describes the ascension of the soul to God, where it is 
restored and regains its true nature. After this, Kircher embarks on an explanation of this 
process in terms of his metaphysics of light, but he is conscious of the obscurity of his 
exegesis, which he tries to elucidate with the example of the camera obscura.  
One should carefully observe, Kircher recommends, how the rays of the sun (with its 
enormous diameter) all pass through a little hole, how a pyramidal cone is formed in which 
the rays are switched around so that the image of the sun appears inverted on an opposite 
                                                 
50 Kircher (1654, p. 616): ‘Cum exaltatus fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum. Certe quomodo id 
completum sit, nemo est qui nesciat. Nam hisce funiculis crucis magneticis, hisce vinculis mox totus mundus 
attractus post eum abiit, hoc magnete Principes, Reges, Imperatores attracti relictis sceptris, mundoque spreto, 
Christo magneti adhaeserunt.’ See also Kircher (1631, pp. 63-65). Interestingly, Ward (1640, pp. 42-48), a 
puritan preacher in Ipswich, also gives the example of the (magnetic) rescue of Peter, together with other 
examples of biblical magnetism, in the context of a magnetic theology. He writes: ‘these sensible helpes of Faith, 
are not altogether to be despised, which after their manner and measure, doe further and strengthen our Faith’ 
(Ward, 1640, pp. 44). This already shows that Jesuit modes of religiosity were to a large extend shared by other 
orders and denominations. Works on the Renaissance tradition of paradox (Colie, 1966), and the tradition of 
jokes and laughter in Christianity (Screech, 1997), might also help to illuminate the use of such seemingly 
contentious artefacts. Of course, also mechanical artefacts might, in specific contexts, have metaphysical and 
theological meanings (e.g. traditional ideas of God as clockmaker, illustrations of God with a pair of compasses). 
Findlen (2003, pp. 240-255) stresses Kircher’s more Aristotelian instruments.   
51 Note that love (best symbolised by the magnet, see e.g. book III,9 of the Magnes: ‘De magnetismo amoris’) 
plays this crucial role in Kircher’s metaphysics of light, which indicates again that his magnetic and light-
metaphysics are interdependent. For parallels with Kircher’s theory of music, and his use of musical instruments 
to embody cosmic harmonies, see Gouk (1999, pp. 144-153); see Heninger (1974) for the broader context.  
52 Apuleius (notorious as the alleged translator of the Corpus Hermeticum) wrote it as a mirror-tale in his 
Metamorphoses, in which the hero was transformed into an ass and had to endure many worldly tribulations, 
before being saved. This salvation was a consequence of his conversion to the Egyptian cult of Isis, which 
coincided with his regaining his human form and dignity (Apuleius, 1989).  
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wall. The projected disc will become larger, the further the cone is prolonged (by shifting the 
wall), and to equal the size of the sun, the incoming and outgoing cones should be of equal 
length. Kircher then explains: ‘In a similar way, the influxes of the ideas that are derived from 
the highest life to the lower, are driven from very small straits into a most particular straitness, 
until they are reflected by matter and bodies, and are brought back from the singular to the 
universal in the human souls, to regain their old magnificence.’53 The image presented here is 
that of intersecting lines, forming two cones (cones like the one shown in Fig. 9, in which 
some intermediate stadia are visualised). The left side is the divine emanation, the Platonist 
eidè or the Archetypal ideas, which are infused into the world. This narrowing cone represents 
the descent into the different scales of being, the gradual increase in embodiment and the 
waning of the divine Light. The intersection point corresponds to pure singularity or 
materiality. The widening right cone represents the recollectio, the return to God, the 
abstraction and generalisation, in which the soul and the angelic intellect play a crucial role. 
In this rational and intellectual light, the eidè are again abstracted out of the material world, 
and in this process, the soul can ascend to God (that is why the cones should be of equal 
length, because the eidè have to be fully restored). As can be seen, at first the light gradually 
wanes into darkness, to disappear at the point of singularity, symbolising pure materiality, to 
revive again, and to be restored to its original splendour. 
This is the core of Kircher’s metaphysics of light, embodied in the operation of the camera 
obscura. This scheme resembles Cusanus’ and Fludd’s intersecting light cones (Cusanus, 
1972, I, ch. 11; and Fludd, 1617, pp. 97, 165), which represent a similar metaphysics, and an 
image of intersecting cones is reproduced on Kircher’s title page, together with a biblical 
                                                 
53 Kircher (1671, p. 804): ‘Ita & idearum influxus a suprema vita in inferiorem derivati, ex angustissimis maxime 
in angustiam particularem rediguntur, donec a materie, atque corporibus reflexi, iterum in humanos animos ex 
singularibus facti universales, amplitudine pristina potiantur.’ The ‘ex angustissimis maxime in angustiam 
particularem’ is difficult to interpret, but I propose to read it as an account of what happens near the hole of the 
camera obscura, where the rays of light come together, are even further compressed, and all pass through a very 
narrow hole. On a metaphysical plane, a similar ‘compression’ would happen with the (archetypal) ideas when 
they are embodied.   
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quotation (Fig. 10).54 The caption ‘sicut tenebrae eius, ita et lumen eius’ (as is His darkness, 
so is His light [Ps. 139,12]), is a phrase popular and widely used in mystical texts.55 In 
Richard Rolle’s (1914, p. 239) Emendatio Vitae (The Mending of Life), for instance, it is 
explained with the words: ‘The mind’s sight is truly taken up to behold heavenly things, yet 
by shadowly sight and in a mirror, not clearly and openly: whiles we go by faith we see as it 
were by a mirror and shadow.’ In the Ars Magna, the emblem represents the interaction 
between the realm of the light and the realm of shadows. In this image, the two light cones of 
the camera obscura are identified, but the role of darkness is made explicit by superimposing 
an inversed dark cone.56 The fading of the light is accompanied by a reinforcement of the 
shadows, and vice versa. In Kircher’s Oedipus Aegyptiacus, it stands for the sphere of love, in 
which the World Soul infuses the whole cosmos with a ray of love. It also symbolises the 
relation between the angelic, sidereal and elemental worlds and the different hierarchies of 
being (see e.g. Kircher 1650, II, p. 450). This emblematic image, on the title page of the Ars 
Magna, again indicates the metaphysical stake of the whole work, which can be interpreted as 
a guidebook for the mind’s sight, which ‘is truly taken up to behold heavenly things, yet by 
shadowly sight and in a mirror’ (cf. supra).57  
It is striking that in the Mystical Sphere, or the Tropologue of Light and Shadow, the section 
after the epilogue in the Ars Magna, the ascension of the soul to God is also phrased in terms 
reminiscent of a camera obscura. When St. Anthony and St. Benedict ‘philosophised in the 
                                                 
54 See note 35. 
55 Kircher’s work and context was based on authorities who were marked by the mystical tradition. Ignatius of 
Loyola, for instance, was himself an important ‘mystic’ (de Guibert, 1964, pp. 558-565), who lived in a tradition 
of Spanish, Jewish and Islamic mystics (de Nicolás, 1986, pp. 17-23) and had to be careful that the first Jesuits 
were not branded ‘alumbrados’ or ‘illuminists’. The mystical tendencies of Ficino and Bovillus are also well 
known. For the cited phrase, see e.g. John of the Cross (1964a, Stanza 13, §1; and 1964b, Stanza 2, §31). See 
also Rolle of Hampole (1914, p. 239) and Hilton (1991, ch. 9).  
56 The camera obscura made clear that the two ways, the emanation and the recollection, are not identical. There 
are different processes involved in the embodiment and disembodiment respectively. Nevertheless, they may be 
considered as the same path traversed in opposite directions. 
57 See also Bach (1985, pp. 209-220) and Marquet (1987, p. 236) for other interpretations of these light cones or 
‘pyramids’. See also Bovillus, who draws a similar image in his Liber de Sensu (Bovillus, 1510, pp. 23r, 29v) in 
order to clarify the structure of perception. 
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woods’, they saw the whole world in one divine ray (cf. Fig. 8). As we have seen, Kircher 
notes, all creatures are little parts of the divine light, and what else could be represented in the 
‘dark room of the heart’ but everything in everything and everything in God. Everyone 
wanting to reach such a sublime state of contemplation, should shut all the windows and 
doors of his soul, to concentrate himself on the ray of divine light (Kircher, 1671, p. 809). 
Kircher’s words are so lucid that it is evidently right to interpret this ‘dark room of the soul’ 
as a camera obscura, which becomes the visible symbol of the ascent to God.  
 
Technological expressionism 
 
I have shown that Kircher gives multiple indications to read his instruments in a religious and 
metaphysical way, as ‘visualisations of the invisible’. In using this kind of allegory or 
symbolism, Kircher is a child of his time. Apart from a vogue of symbolism, however, the 
Jesuits had also more subtle reasons for not making certain meanings explicit. In their attempt 
to gain dominance in education and at court, Catholic messages should not be too overt in 
order to avoid provocation, and their work had to be mixed with utilitarian and entertaining 
aspects. But there is an even deeper reason why some religious messages cannot be made 
explicit: some meanings, especially religious, moral and aesthetic, cannot be expressed in an 
explicit way without destroying their impact. For this reason, bluntly stating that God, and the 
metaphysics of light and magnetism, are present at every level of the cosmos would be banal; 
it is a truth that only makes sense when lived through.  
This is particularly clear when we look at Jesuit modes of reading and spectatorship. The 
Jesuits’ attitude towards books, images and artefacts was significantly shaped by traditions of 
mnemonics and meditation. In his Autobiography (Ignatius, 1992, §6-7), Ignatius of Loyola 
describes how he used reading to fix memory points, which he then visualised in order to 
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imprint them into his soul. He became convinced that one should imitate and incorporate the 
lives of Christ and the saints. In his Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius formalised these techniques 
of reading and he selected passages from the Bible which should be visualised and meditated 
upon. He had also urged one of his disciples, Jerome Nadal, to illustrate these passages in 
order to furnish novices with an illustrated guide to meditation. This resulted in Nadal’s 
remarkable Evangelicae historiae imagines (1593), with 153 engravings representing scenes 
from the New Testament and a legend explicating them (similar to Fig. 8). The images 
indicated the memory points and now formed, together with the legend and the short text of 
the Spiritual Exercises, the basis for meditative exercises (Nadal 1593; see also Fig. 8 and 
Fig. 11).58  
Jesuits often did not read or look in order to collect information; nor were they looking for 
aesthetic pleasure. Their reading had a different rhythm. They searched for anchor points for 
concentration and meditation. Their reading of texts and images was meant to stimulate the 
senses, memory and the imagination, in order to prepare for a particular meditative practice. 
After going trough the four week ‘training programme’ of the Spiritual Exercises, the scope 
of their spiritual practice was further extended. The Jesuit novices learned to focus on other 
objects, beyond religious texts and images, and ‘to recognise the same spiritual affects in re-
enacting the mysteries of nature’ (Heelan, 1986, pp. xiii). In the end, these meditative 
experiences were meant to pervade their daily life. In his ‘tropological rules’, Kircher 
describes how the soul can climb to God via the contemplation of the phenomenal world. One 
way, he explains, is for the soul to imitate the characteristics of light (Kircher, 1671, pp. 808-
810). In the Ad Lectorem of the Ars Magna, Kircher had already asserted that our mind will 
                                                 
58 Of course, the practices of meditation discussed here have a broader context, e.g. of the Devotio Moderna, but 
the Spiritual Exercises was a unique handbook that formed the kernel of the Jesuit system, and the Jesuit novices 
were thoroughly trained in the meditative techniques included in it. For a comparison with other meditative 
practices in the same period, and on a possible broader use of the term ‘meditation’ see e.g. Hatfield (1986) (and 
Rubidge (1990) for a critique) and Grafton (2000). See esp. Dear (1995b) for ‘meditation’ in the seventeenth-
century sciences, which suggests interesting parallels between scientific and religious practices. For the tradition 
of mnemonics, see e.g. the classic works by Yates (2001), Rossi (2000) and Carruthers (1990, pp. 156-188). On 
meditation on the bible and allegorese, see note 7. 
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ascend the different levels of being and will be united with our divine Origin, only on the 
basis of our contemplation of the corporeal light. This corporeal light, the visible symbol of 
the divine Light, is properly staged in Kircher’s instruments and exemplified in the chapters 
of his book. These instruments, as is particularly clear in the image of the camera obscura for 
the ascent of the soul, will guide us to God (cf. Fig. 9). 
The religious reader must discover the truth of the metaphysics of light and magnetism for 
himself, not by reading theological tracts, but by contemplating the wondrous works of God, 
which Kircher compiles and complements. Kircher prepares the reader for this ‘ah-ha’-
experience, for the recognition of God’s signs in the world. This openness for the divine 
signs, for the ‘vestigia Trinitatis’, is part of the Jesuit meditative practice and would come, 
ideally, to permeate every aspect of one’s life. Kircher writes: ‘… in these things themselves, 
as if they were a kind of mirrors (lenses), you will see God, in the bodies you will see the 
shadow of God, in the souls you will see the resemblance and image of God, and in the 
Angels you will see His image even more perfect. […] You compile a complete figure out of 
the observation of all things, so that the absolute beauty of all things, which is dispersed in 
everything, would be collected in your mind by grasping one image.’59 
It can be inferred from Kircher’s particular metaphysics that it was compelling for him to 
‘embody’ metaphysical truths into real instruments. Kircher’s metaphysics makes clear the 
importance of the cosmic ‘incarnation’. In Neo-Platonist and Hermetic theories the world is 
the embodiment or emanation of an original divine principle, and in the Christian New 
Testament, this process is re-staged in the doctrine of the incarnation of God. This downwards 
process of reification is a central element of Christian metaphysics, and is manifest in 
Kircher’s work. Since it was the task of a Jesuit to do God’s work on earth, he could partake 
                                                 
59 ‘Si igitur corpora, si animas, si Angelos, non haec quidem, sed in ipsis, veluti speculis quibusdam DEUM 
intueberis, in corporibus quidem DEI umbram, in animabus DEI similitudinem imaginemque, & longe eam in 
Angelis perfectiorem invenies; ita ut quicquid ubique rectum est, colligas, ex collato figuram integram ex 
observatione omnium fabrices, ut absoluta rerum omnium in omnibus dispersa pulchritudo in animo tuo unius fit 
imaginis comprehensione collecta.’ (Kircher, 1654, p. 617). 
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in this process of embodiment. Indeed, the reification of the archetypal ideas, as explained by 
means of the camera obscura, could be emulated in the actual construction of the instrument, 
in the awareness that ideas (texts) have to be embodied (artefacts). In this way, God could 
express himself through his servants on earth, who could act as secondary demiurges; and 
while the cosmos should be interpreted as an expression of God’s archetypal ideas, Kircher’s 
instruments are to be seen as an expression of his metaphysics, of God’s eidè and of the 
structure of the cosmos. 
Our inter-medial approach has unearthed a very peculiar kind of ‘technology’ that seems 
completely alien today. Kircher’s technologies do not fit into one simple category, and they 
are hardly subsumable under a straightforward functionalism, as is most clearly illustrated by 
those instruments or ‘hoaxes’ defying every natural law known today. Multiple layers of 
meaning were connected with the instruments at the Collegio Romano, and I would like to see 
them as expressions of these different meanings. As can be seen in our different examples, 
from the magnetic Christ to the camera obscura, many of Kircher’s instruments were devised 
as embodiments of transcendent truths. Different meanings were mixed: these instruments 
were not simply made to do something; rather, their very essence was a visualisation of the 
hidden structures of the universe and the divine emanation. One of Kircher’s ‘axiomata’ at the 
beginning of the Ars Magna (and derived from Plato and Maimonides) states: ‘what technique 
is for humans, nature is for God’. Since nature and the creation are not means to an end, but 
an expression of God’s majesty and His relation with the universe, technique will also be an 
expression of these concerns, such as, for instance, man’s place in the cosmos. We can find 
signs and meanings in technical artefacts similar to the divine signs to be found in nature.  
In this paper, I have stressed the expressive aspects of technology. It is in Kircher’s work, 
with its explicit metaphysics of embodiment and emanation, that these aspects could be 
maximally displayed. Although Kircher’s metaphysics, in which everything is a divine 
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‘expression’, seems to be untenable today, it is important to bring the expressive potentials of 
technology again to the fore.60 
 
By way of conclusion: the meaning and utility of artefacts  
 
This essay was a search for the different ‘meanings’ (or ‘uses’) of Kircher’s devices. I have 
analysed different texts and illustrations related with his artefacts, and indicated the practices 
in which they were used. His instruments carried ‘scientific’, political, social and apostolic 
meanings, as well as meanings related with entertainment, spectacles and courtly culture. I 
argued, however, that it is particularly important to interpret Kircher’s artefacts in their 
metaphysical framework, since metaphysics (and the related theology) took central place in 
Kircher’s worldview.61 According to Kircher, God is the source of all meaning. This meaning 
was diversified, radiated and emanated into the world, and all meaning has – in the end – to 
be referred back to God. The bearing of the relation between Kircher’s instruments and 
metaphysics is especially clear in the epilogue of the Ars Magna, where Kircher phrased his 
metaphysics in exactly the terms used for describing a camera obscura. This made it possible 
for me to describe the representation of his artefacts in his texts, and vice versa, to describe 
the representation of his texts in his artefacts. Both these interpretative moves were necessary 
for understanding the meaning of some of Kircher’s ‘textual’ and ‘actual’ artefacts. In 
performing this ‘double way’ exercise, I have also tried to show the promises of integrating 
the history of material culture with the history of texts and ideas. 
After the early-modern period rhetoric of ‘utility’, instruments were almost exclusively seen 
in the light of a narrow economic and technical concept of ‘utility’. Historically, the ‘use’ of 
                                                 
60 I think that contemporary philosophies of technology do not sufficiently recognise the diversity of practices in 
which artefacts are used today. Indeed, I think that there are prospects for an ‘expressionism’ in technology 
studies. 
61 Note, however, that I do not claim to provide an ultimate interpretative key for Kircher’s work. 
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artefacts is much more diverse, however, as the example of Kircher’s instruments shows. 
Different modes of using, which incorporate ways of reading and kinds of spectatorship, 
generate a diversity of meanings. I have argued that Kircher’s artefacts and texts were 
embedded in a Jesuit context, characterised by meditative practices and particular modes of 
reading and spectatorship, but they also fulfilled a crucial role in his patronage relationships 
and were part of a ‘spectacular’ culture. Uses or practices interact with each other, and 
instruments can be used in different practices, sometimes even simultaneously, and there is no 
reason to suppose that they have the same meaning for everyone. Often, the form and design 
of an artefact are underdetermined by its primary function. In that case, there is ample 
opportunity for artefacts to become nodal-points of different meanings, uses and practices, 
and they may be said to ‘express’ these meanings. Kircher’s clocks, for instance, were at once 
measuring instruments and representations of political and metaphysical meanings. From the 
above analysis of Kircher’s instruments, it is clear that artefacts can be used in many ways, 
even within one overarching practice. 
Books are artefacts too. When they are transposed to a new environment, new meanings are 
generated while the old ones fade away.62 As material objects, they can be revised by editors, 
parts can be cut out, and patched up collections can be reissued. In later editions of Kircher’s 
notes, in new collections compiled from particular segments of his oeuvre, and in the later 
descriptions of his museum, the metaphysics was left out, in favour of the entertainment value 
and the display of technical virtuosity.63 The modes of reading corresponding to later 
rationalist and Enlightenment ideologies also neglected the religious and metaphysical 
components of Kircher’s work, only focussing on the allegedly new inventions and 
                                                 
62 On the history of the book in relation to the history of the sciences, see Johns (1998) and Frasca-Spada & 
Jardine (2000). 
63 Cf. De Sepibus (1678), Kestler (1680), Buonanni (1709), de Ruggiero (1878), de Ruggiero (1879), as well as 
adaptations and appropriations of Kircher’s work in Schott (1657), Schott (1660) and Schott (1667). Later 
works, such as de Contucci (1763-5), Brunati (1837) and Paribeni (1904) deal only with antiquarian material 
found in what was left from the Kircherian museum.  
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instruments. In this way, Kircher’s metaphysics and the metaphysical importance of his 
instruments disappeared.  
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Fig. 1: Thesis broadsheet commissioned by Lorenzo Raggi, who defended in philosophy at 
the Collegio Romano in 1637. It was dedicated to Cardinal Francesco Barberini and the fictive 
tapestry at the centre represents the abundance of the Golden Age. The bees are symbols of 
both the Barberini family and the Jesuits. From Rice (1999, p. 157). The visual appearance of 
this broadsheet, and especially its text-image relationship, somewhat resembles Jesuit 
devotional books (Fig. 8). © University of Toronto Press. 
 
Fig. 2: Kircher (1671, p. 127). Woodcut of a perspective device. The instrument is rendered 
schematically and in a very abstract way. It was not really meant to be used, but served to 
illustrate the theory of perspective. Here, Alberti’s ‘construzione legittima’ is shown. Similar 
devices were well known, and the most famous illustration of them is probably Dürer’s 
‘draftsman drawing a nude’, a realistic woodcut published in Unterweysung der Messung 
(1538). This and all the following figures in this paper, if no other acknowledgement is given: 
© Library of Theology, Leuven University. 
 
Fig. 3: Kircher (1671, p. 364). A complex sundial, in the form of a heraldic eagle, floating 
(flying?) in the foreground of a detailed landscape. The eagle, symbol of the Habsburg Roman 
Empire, is flanked by emperor Ferdinand’s name, which is also devised as a sundial. The 
contrast between the naturalistic landscape and the awkwardly placed (but also naturalistically 
executed) instrument gives the picture its particular effect, and strengthens its symbolic 
character. Not only the devise is symbolical, the placing of the sundial also symbolises the 
power of the emperor, spanning land, see and air, and of course time, aided by the (divine) 
light.   
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Fig. 4: Kircher (1671, p. 770). The ‘Parastatic Smicroscope’, an instrument used for showing 
(religious) pictures. Here 8 stages of the Passion of Christ are shown. The instrument is 
naturalistically drawn, but is cast in an abstract white background. Different sides are shown, 
and an objectified bodiless eye looks through the tube to illustrate its use. This ‘abstraction’ is 
a bid for authority and indicates the instrument’s mathematical pretensions. Only by means of 
the images, the religious context is sneaked in again. (‘Smicroscope’ and ‘microscope’ are in 
fact synonymous in Greek, but this instrument does not resemble the better known 
microscopes). 
 
Fig. 5: Frontispiece of Kircher’s (1671) Ars Magna, engraved by Petrus Miotte of Burgundy. 
This frontispiece visualises what is at the stake in the Ars Magna. God, the source of the 
divine light, radiates downwards from the archetypal world to the sublunar world, connecting 
everything in between. All elements of this image are loaded with symbolic meanings. 
 
Fig. 6: Frontispiece of Kircher’s (1654) Magnes, composed by I.B. Rinalducius. This 
frontispiece is lacking in some copies of the first and second editions, sometimes it was added 
as the frontispiece of the third book of the volume. The outer part of the picture was added in 
the latest edition (obscuring the names of the original artist, engraver and publisher), in order 
to adapt the picture to the new folio format of the book. Magnetic chains connect the whole of 
the universe. The diverse ‘sciences’ are coupled to the three worlds – the sideral, sublunar and 
the microcosm – which in their turn touch (emanate from) the divine rays of the archetypal 
world at the centre. A divine eagle, with the symbols of justice and law-giving power, holds 
the whole structure in his claws. 
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Fig. 7: Kircher (1654, p. 297). The magnetic dip (termed ‘inclination’ by Kircher and 
‘declination’ by Gilbert) was the deviation of a compass needle from the horizontal plane. 
Kircher believed, as did Gilbert and Cabeo, that this deviation was a function of the degree of 
latitude. They thought that when the magnetic dip was measured at a certain place (by means 
of an ‘inclinometer’, depicted and described in Kircher, 1654, pp. 307-311), it was possible to 
determine the latitude of this place. Figure 7 is a mathematical instrument for deriving the 
magnetic dip, given the degree of latitude, and vice versa. In order for the instrument to work, 
a moving quadrant should be attached in point E (this can be found in some copies of the 
Magnes). The instrument bears the inscription: ‘Just as the magnet slopes towards a single 
centre, even so does our heart point inwards towards God.’ This shows that real instruments 
often had symbolical meanings as well.  
 
Fig. 8: David (1610, p. 96). Narrative image from a Jesuit devotional book, making clear that 
we can see God in natural phenomena as well as in a mirror. At the centre, two people see 
God through a mirror. The corresponding caption for this part of the figure (ABC) reads: 
‘contemplating the invisible through the visible’. This corresponds well with Kircher’s 
approach to mirrors in the Ars Magna and the Magnes. In the background, at the left, one sees 
Jacob’s ladder (D), a traditional image of the bridge between heaven and earth (Gen. 28: 10-
22). Job stands in front of this ladder (F), which guides us via the created world towards the 
celestial secrets (D). In the caption F, one is urged to meditate on how far Job has ascended 
the ladder by considering the works of God (cf. Job: 23). At the right, Saint Bernardus is in 
the woods contemplating God (E). In the middle section of the picture, someone looks at the 
lilies in the field and the birds in the sky, while a woman inspects the heavenly acre (GH). 
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Fig. 9: Kircher (1671, p. 84). A schematic visualisation of what happens with light rays when 
they pass through a small hole. This woodcut, taken from the chapter on radiation, in which 
Kircher discusses the principle of the camera obscura, fits in well with his metaphysical 
discussion of the descent and ascent of ideas. 
 
Fig. 10:  Kircher (1671, title page) Emblematic picture on the title page of Kircher’s Ars 
Magna. This emblem of intersecting dark and light pyramids is richly-laden with meaning. It 
depicts the relation (and intertwining) of the higher principles with the lower, which can be 
expressed in different ways. In the Ars Magna Lucis et Umbrae, it represents the interaction 
between the realm of the light and the realm of shadows.  
 
Fig 11: Image from a devotional emblem book (de Montenay, 1584, p. 5). Here, the image of 
the magnet is used as a starting point for contemplating divine attraction. The corresponding 
caption reads: ‘The iron is attracted by a magnetic power; and we are drawn to Christ by the 
merciful God. Therefore do not expect to live by your own power: but recognise your life as a 
gift granted to you by God.’  
 
 
